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How do house prices respond to changes in the central bank policy rate? The answer is
central to understanding the drivers of house price fluctuations. It is also important for
the discussion of whether central banks should use the interest rate to enhance financial
stability – particularly in order to quantify the potential trade-off between financial and
real economic stability. Establishing the effect of monetary policy on house prices is far
from trivial. First of all, the durability of housing entails that housing supply is rigid
downwards (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005), implying that an interest rate increase should,
ceteris paribus, have a larger impact on house prices than a corresponding reduction in
the interest rate. Secondly, it is well known that there are tremendous heterogeneities
across regional housing markets (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2012), which means that changes
in the policy rate could have differential effects across local areas within the same country.
Somewhat surprisingly, the asymmetric effects of monetary policy across regional housing
markets remain unexplored.
In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by exploring (i) Whether differences in city-
specific housing supply elasticities matter for the responsiveness of house prices to ex-
ogenous monetary policy shocks and (ii) The extent of asymmetry in the response to
expansionary and contractionary monetary policy shocks. We estimate impulse responses
for house prices to monetary policy shocks using panel data and local projection methods
(Jordà, 2005). Our sample covers 263 US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) over
the period 1983Q1-2007Q4.
Although house prices are not directly part of the central bank’s reaction function,
they can affect the interest rate indirectly through their impact on consumption and em-
ployment (see e.g., Mian et al. (2013) and Mian and Sufi (2014)). To deal with potential
reverse causality and to identify exogenous shifts in monetary policy, we make use of the
narrative monetary policy shocks of Romer and Romer (2004).1 To study regional varia-
1We use an updated version of the Romer and Romer (2004) narrative shock series extending through
2007. To update the Romer and Romer shock, we use the code and data provided by Wieland and Yang
(2016).
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tions in the transmission of expansionary and contractionary monetary policy shocks to
house prices, we interact the Romer and Romer shock with the housing supply elasticities
calculated by Saiz (2010).
Our results are consistent with the view that expansionary monetary policy shocks
have a considerably greater impact on house prices in markets with inelastic housing
supply. For congested areas, such as Miami, Los Angeles and San Francisco, we estimate
that house prices increase by almost seven percent two years after a monetary policy
shock that lowers the interest rate by one percentage point. For areas with higher housing
supply elasticity, such as Kansas City, Oklahoma City and Indianapolis, the same effect
is estimated to be below three percent. In contrast, we find that the effect on house
prices of a contractionary shock of similar magnitude is independent of housing supply
elasticity. This is consistent with a downward rigidity of housing supply, which holds
irrespective of local regulatory restrictions and topographical constraints. Finally, we find
that whether expansionary or contractionary shocks have the strongest impact on house
prices depends on local housing supply elasticities. For MSAs with low housing supply
elasticities, expansionary monetary policy shocks are found to have a markedly larger
effect on house prices than contractionary shocks. However, in areas with high housing
supply elasticity, the effect of expansionary shocks is muted, leading to a stronger impact
of contractionary shocks.
From the view of a standard supply-demand framework with durable housing con-
tractionary shocks will always have a greater impact on house prices than expansionary
shocks unless supply is perfectly inelastic. In light on this, our finding is “puzzling”. We
present results suggesting that this “puzzle” can be explained by a momentum effect that
is more pronounced when house prices are increasing.2 Consequently, expansionary mon-
etary policy shocks, which ceteris paribus lead to an increase in house prices, trigger a
2Following the seminal paper by Case and Shiller (1989), momentum in house prices has been accepted
as a key feature of the housing market, and Glaeser et al. (2014) listed predictability of house price changes
by past house price changes as one of three stylized facts about the housing market. Consistent with
this, we find strong evidence of a momentum effect in our sample. Moreover, we document that this
momentum effect is particularly strong when house prices are increasing.
3
momentum effect that puts additional pressure on house prices. Since the initial response
in house prices is greater when the elasticity of supply is low, this momentum effect will be
more pronounced in congested areas. When house prices are falling, we find this momen-
tum effect to be much weaker. As a result of this, the effect of expansionary shocks may
be greater than, equal to, or smaller than the effect of contractionary shocks, depending
on the elasticity of housing supply. For very inelastic areas, such as Miami, San Francisco
and Los Angeles, we find that expansionary shocks have almost twice the effect on house
prices relative to contractionary shocks. On the contrary, contractionary shocks are esti-
mated to exercise a stronger impact on house prices in Kansas City, Oklahoma City and
Indianapolis – areas with high housing supply elasticity. In the case of Indianapolis, the
effect of contractionary shocks is three times as large as that of expansionary shocks.
There is a growing literature looking at the nexus between monetary policy and house
prices (see e.g., Del Negro and Otrok (2007), Iacoviello (2005), Jarocinski and Smets
(2008), Jordà et al. (2015) and Williams (2011, 2015)). These papers are, however, con-
fined to studying aggregate effects on house prices, which masks the major heterogeneities
existing across regional US housing markets.3 For instance, while nominal house prices
increased by more than 160 percent in some coastal areas of Florida and California from
2000 to 2006, they increased by less than 20 percent in inland open space areas of the Mid-
west. We add to this literature by documenting non-trivial heterogeneous responses to a
common exogenous monetary policy shock across regional markets, as well as document-
ing an economically important and sizeable asymmetry in the response to expansionary
and contractionary monetary policy shocks.
Another branch of the literature has attributed regional variations in the amplitude
of boom-bust cycles in the housing market to heterogeneous supply side restrictions (see
e.g., Green et al. (2005), Saiz (2010), Gyourko et al. (2008), Glaeser et al. (2008), Glaeser
3One exception is Del Negro and Otrok (2007). They use a dynamic factor model on state level data to
disentangle the relative importance of local and national shocks. They find that historically movements in
house prices were mainly driven by local shocks. However, they highlight that the period 2001-2005 was
different, as house prices during this period were mostly driven by national shocks. Although they also
find the impact of common monetary policy shocks on house prices to be non-negligible, their estimates
are fairly small in comparison with the magnitude of the house price increase over this five-year period.
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(2009), Huang and Tang (2012) and Anundsen and Heebøll (2016)). This literature has
shown that house price booms tend to be larger in markets with an inelastic housing
supply. Our results add to this literature by documenting a substantial heterogeneity in
the transmission of monetary policy shocks that depends on housing supply elasticities.
While our paper is the first to quantify the asymmetric effects of monetary policy on
house prices, Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016), Barnichon and Matthes (2017) and Angrist
et al. (2017) have documented an asymmetric effect of contractionary and expansionary
monetary policy shocks on the real economy. In particular, these papers find that an
interest rate reduction is less effective in stimulating the real economy than an increase
in the interest rate is in curbing economic activity. Our results suggest that the opposite
is true for house prices in many US metro areas.
These results have direct bearing on the discussion on the trade-offs faced by monetary
policymakers when it comes to real economic stability and financial stability. Reducing
the interest rate in order to stimulate the real economy may not be very effective, but at
the same time it may contribute to amplifying the volatility of house prices – particularly
so in supply inelastic areas. At the same time, an increase in the interest rate may have
a large impact on the real economy without affecting house prices to the same extent as
an expansionary monetary policy shock.
Our results are robust to various sensitivity checks. Controlling for differences in
regional economic conditions, institutional and regulatory differences by adding Census
Division-by-quarter fixed effects do not materially affect our results. Using a balanced
panel of 147 MSAs, covering the full sample period in our estimation, does not alter
our conclusions. Finally, our results are robust to calculating impulse responses for each
MSA separately, allowing for complete heterogeneity in coefficients. In this case, the
house prices responses to contractionary and expansionary shocks are grouped according
to local housing supply elasticities using the mean group estimator of Pesaran and Smith
(1995).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section motivates why hetero-
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geneities and asymmetries may be of particular relevance in the housing markets. Section
3 presents the data we utilize and Section 4 documents our empirical findings on the het-
erogeneous and asymmetric effects of monetary policy. We outline possible mechanisms
that could generate our findings in Section 5, whereas several robustness and sensitivity
checks are carried out in Section 6. The final section concludes.
2 Monetary policy shocks in a model with durable hous-
ing
To motivate why heterogeneities and asymmetries in the response to monetary policy
shocks may be of particular relevance in a housing market context, we consider a very
simple motivating framework, where house prices in a given area are determined by the
intersection of demand and supply.
We follow Glaeser et al. (2008) and distinguish between the existing stock of houses
and the supply of houses in the market at a particular point in time. The number of
houses available for sale in area i at time t is denoted Si,t, which consists of a proportion,
ψ, of the existing stock of houses, Hi,t−1, put up for sale by existing home owners4 and
new investments, Ii,t. Similar to Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), we assume that investments
are zero whenever prices are below construction costs and that housing is a durable good.
To capture these features, we postulate the following linear supply schedule:5
Si,t =
 ψHi,t−1 if PHi,t ≤ Pi,tψHi,t−1 + ϕi (PHi,t − Pi,t) if PHi,t > Pi,t (1)
4This can be motivated as in Glaeser et al. (2008), where each homeowner with a certain probability
receives a Poisson-distributed shock. If they receive the shock, they have to sell. Otherwise, they stay in
the house. With a continuum of homeowners, the number of sales will be deterministic and proportional
to the existing stock of houses. The housing stock is in turn determined by a standard law-of-motion of
capital accumulation, so that the stock at t is equal to the sum of the non-depreciated stock from t− 1
and new investments.
5One could also motivate this by assuming that construction firms are idle when prices fall below
construction costs, and that they otherwise maximize profits.
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where PHi,t measures house prices, Pi,t is the unit price of a composite input factor used
to produce houses, while ϕi is an area-specific housing supply elasticity. With this setup,
the supply curve is piecewise linear and kinked: only if the price exceeds the fixed cost of
construction will supply increase. Hence, supply is assumed completely rigid downwards,
motivated by the fact that housing is usually neither demolished nor dismantled (Glaeser
and Gyourko (2005)).
We let housing demand be represented by a linear demand function:
Di,t = v0rt + v1Yi,t + v2PHi,t (2)
where rt is the interest rate, which is common across local markets, and Yi,t is household
income in area i.
To illustrate the conjectures of this skeleton model, assume that market i is charac-
terized by house prices equal to construction costs at time 0 (PHi,0 = Pi,0), which also
implies that Ii,0 = 0 and hence that Si,0 = ψHi,−1. Then, market i is hit by an expan-
sionary monetary policy shock at time 1. This will lead to a greater house price increase
in supply inelastic markets. Figure 1 gives a visual illustration of this for the case of a
market with high supply elasticity and a market with low supply elasticity. In this figure,
the supply curve at time 0 is drawn with a kink at the equilibrium price, to reflect that
houses are durable and that once they are built, they are usually not destroyed.
As seen, a positive demand shock (D0 to D1) primarily leads to quantity adjustments
in supply elastic markets, while the shock is mostly absorbed in terms of higher prices in
inelastic markets. To ensure market clearing, the part of the adjustment that is taken by
higher prices is larger the lower the supply elasticity. At the same time, the supply curve
will now kink at point B instead of point A. Thus, the dotted part of the old supply curve
is no longer relevant, since newly built houses are not destroyed, and a negative shock
would lead to an adjustment along the vertical part of the supply curve.
In Figure 2, we show the effect of a contractionary monetary policy shock. Since sup-
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ply is rigid downwards, this means that the demand curve shifts along the vertical part
of the supply curve, independent of supply elasticity. The conjecture is that the drop in
house prices following a contractionary monetary policy shock is independent of supply
elasticity. Furthermore, the drop in prices following the contractionary shock is predicted
to always be greater (in absolute value) than the increase in house prices following a
similar sized expansionary shock – as long as supply is not completely inelastic, in which
the supply curve would always be vertical. This asymmetry arises due to the durability
of housing, and a similar conjecture comes out of the model of urban decline in Glaeser
and Gyourko (2005). We summarize these conjectures below.6
Conjecture # 1: Expansionary shocks have a larger impact on house prices in markets
with an inelastic housing supply.
Conjecture # 2: The effect of contractionary monetary policy shocks is independent
of supply elasticity.
Conjecture # 3: For any positive supply elasticity, contractionary shocks have a larger
impact on house prices than expansionary shocks.
6In Appendix A, we derive the analytical expressions giving rise to these conjectures.
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Market 1: High supply elasticity Market 2: Low supply elasticity
Note: D0 is the original demand curve, while D1 is the demand curve after the interest rate reduction.
The supply curve is given by S. The initial equilibrium is given by point A. The new equilibrium after
the interest rate reduction is given at point B. The dotted part of the housing supply curve illustrates
that housing supply is rigid downwards, so that the supply curve kinks at A before the shock and at B
after the shock.

























Market 1: High supply elasticity Market 2: Low supply elasticity
Note: D0 is the original demand curve, while D1 is the demand curve after the interest rate increase.
The supply curve is given by S. The initial equilibrium is given by point A. The new equilibrium after
the interest rate increase is given at point B.
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3 Data and descriptive statistics
Our data set includes 263 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the United States,
covering about 70 percent of the entire US population and all but two of the 50 US states
(Hawaii and Alaska are not covered).7 Following the Census Bureau, the US may be split
into nine divisions: Pacific, Mountain, West South Central, West North Central, East
North Central, East South Central, Middle Atlantic, New England and South Atlantic.
Table 1 summarizes some information on the geographical dispersion of the MSAs covered
by our sample across these divisions.
Table 1: Geographical distribution of MSAs in our sample
Census division No. states No. MSAs Med. pop Perc. pop.
Pacific 3 33 426 17
Mountain 8 21 289 7
West North Central 7 25 220 6
South West Central 4 33 390 12
East North Central 5 43 343 14
East South Central 4 18 402 5
New England 5 12 392 4
Middle Atlantic 3 25 427 14
South Atlantic 9 53 415 21
All 48 263 372 100
Note: The table summarizes the geographic distribution of the MSAs covered by our sample across US
Census divisions. The table also shows median population in the MSAs in the different divisions, as well
as the percentage of the total population covered by our sample of MSAs in each of the divisions. We
use population data from 2007Q4.
The table shows that the MSAs are distributed across the entire country and that
the median population size is broadly similar across census divisions. In addition to
having a rich cross-sectional dimension, we also have a fairly long time series dimension
for most of these areas. The sample runs through the period from 1983Q1 to 2007Q4
7Note that some of the MSAs belong to multiple states. The constraining factor in terms of MSA-
coverage is the housing supply elasticities of Saiz (2010), which are available for 269 MSAs using the
1999 county-based MSA or NECMA definitions. The geographic data in Saiz (2010) are calculated using
the principal city in the MSA, and we have matched those to the 2010 MSA definitions. For 6 MSAs, we
were not able to match the Saiz data to the 2010 MSA definitions, as they are no longer the principal
city in their new MSA.
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(T = 100) for 147 of the areas, and 227 MSAs are covered by 1987Q1. We have full
coverage for all MSAs from 1998Q1. For a majority of the MSAs, the sample covers both
the recent housing cycle and the previous boom-bust cycle (Glaeser et al., 2008) in the
period 1982–1996.
Several data sources have been used to compile our data set, and the rest of this
section describes the different data we utilize in our empirical analysis.
3.1 Monetary policy shocks
To measure exogenous changes in monetary policy, we use the Romer and Romer (2004)
narrative monetary policy shock series. Romer and Romer propose a novel procedure to
identify monetary policy shocks. First, they use the narrative approach to extract mea-
sures of the change in the Fed’s target interest rate at each meeting of the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) between 1969 and 1996. They then regress this measure
of policy changes on the Fed’s real-time forecasts of past, current, and future inflation,
output growth, and unemployment. The residuals from this regression constitute their
measure of monetary policy shocks.
The Romer and Romer series has been widely used to study the transmission of
monetary policy shocks, see e.g. Coibion (2012), Ramey (2016), Tenreyro and Thwaites
(2016), Coibion et al. (2017). We use an updated version of the Romer and Romer
(2004) narrative shock series, using the codes and data provided by Wieland and Yang
(2016). The updated shock series ends in 2007Q4. Thus, our analysis is confined to
studying the transmission of conventional monetary policy shocks.8 Moreover, Coibion
(2012) showed that the effects of Romer and Romer identified monetary policy shocks
on various variables are very sensitive to the inclusion of the period of non-borrowed
8Due to the 5 year lag in the publication of the Greenbook forecasts, we could potentially have updated
the Romer and Romer shock series until the end of 2011. However, there are two concerns with such an
approach. First, when constructing the shocks, regressing the change in the Fed’s target interest rate on
the Fed’s real-time forecasts of past, current, and future inflation, output growth, and unemployment
would result in unreasonably large monetary policy shocks for the zero lower bound period. Second,
such an approach would also imply that conventional and unconventional monetary policy shocks have
similar effects on house prices.
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reserves targeting, 1979–1982. We therefore follow Coibion (2012) and exclude the period
of nonborrowed reserve targeting, starting our estimation in 1983Q1.9
3.2 Housing supply elasticities
To explore regional heterogeneities in the response to monetary policy shocks, we use the
MSA-specific supply elasticities calculated by Saiz (2010). These elasticities are based
on both topographical measures of undevelopable land, as outlined in Saiz (2010), as
well as regulatory supply restrictions based on the Wharton Regulatory Land Use Index
(WRLURI) developed by Gyourko et al. (2008). WRLURI measures MSA-level regula-
tory supply restrictions, including complications related to getting a building permit etc.,
whereas the topographical measure captures MSA-level geographical land availability
constraints.
3.3 House prices and control variables
Our source for the house price data is the Federal Housing Finance Agency. We also con-
trol for local differences in households’ disposable income per capita and migration. Both
income and house prices are deflated by MSA-specific CPI indices. Data on local CPIs,
income and migration were collected from Moody’s Analytics’ Economy.com webpage.
Several papers (e.g., Mian and Sufi (2009) and Favara and Imbs (2015)) have em-
phasized the role of lax lending standards as an explanation of regional differences in
house prices. To control for this, we use the time-varying index of branching deregulation
constructed by Rice and Strahan (2010). Favara and Imbs (2015) have used this index
to show that an exogenous expansion in mortgage credit has significant effects on house
prices. The index is constructed to capture regulatory changes governing geographic ex-
pansion for the US banking sector. Following the passage of the Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) in 1994, banks were allowed to operate across state
9Note that, for consistency, the Romer and Romer shock is also estimated on a sample from 1983 to
2007.
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borders without any formal authorization from state authorities. The Rice and Strahan
(2010) index runs from 1994 to 2005 and takes values between 0 and 4. We follow Favara
and Imbs (2015) and reverse the index, so that higher values refer to more deregulated
states. As in Rice and Strahan (2010) and Favara and Imbs (2015), we assume that all
states were fully restricted prior to 1994.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 summarizes average annual house price growth over the period 1983Q1 to 2007Q4
for the MSAs in our sample with a population exceeding one million. The table also shows
the supply elasticity of Saiz (2010) for the same areas. It is clear that the areas with
the highest annual house price growth have lower supply elasticity than the areas with
low house price growth. The bottom part of the table shows summary statistics for both
supply elasticity and average annual house price growth for all MSAs covered by our
sample.
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Table 2: House price growth and supply elasticities for MSAs with population above 1
million.
MSA House price growth Supply elasticity
Top 5 MSAs with population > 1,000,000:
San Francisco-Redwood City-South San Francisco, CA 8.21 0.66
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 8.12 0.76
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA 7.75 0.63
New York-Jersey City-White Plains, NY-NJ 7.67 0.76
Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley, CA 7.51 0.70
Bottom 5 MSAs with population > 1,000,000:
Oklahoma City, OK 1.98 3.29
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX 2.26 2.30
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 2.28 2.80
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX 2.35 2.18
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX 2.64 2.98
Summary stats all MSAs:
10th percentile 3.09 0.86
25th percentile 3.91 1.21
Median 5.01 1.79
75th percentile 6.24 2.59
90th percentile 7.34 3.57
Mean 5.03 2.04
Standard deviation 1.53 1.04
Note: The table shows summary statistics for the supply elasticity of Saiz (2010) and for average
annual growth in nominal house prices over the period 1983Q1-2007Q4. The upper part of the table
shows average annual growth in house prices and supply elasticities for MSAs with a population exceeding
1 million. The first five are the MSAs with the highest average growth in house prices over this period.
The next five are the MSAs with the lowest growth in house prices over the same period. The lower
part of the table shows the distribution of average annual growth in nominal house prices and supply
elasticity over the same period for all MSAs for which data are available for the full sample period.
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4 Asymmetric effects of monetary policy shocks
The supply-demand framework with durable housing that we outlined in Section 2 sug-
gests that expansionary monetary policy shocks should have a greater impact on house
prices in areas with an inelastic housing supply, whereas the response to contractionary
shocks should be similar across areas, due to the downward rigidity of housing supply.
The model also suggests that contractionary shocks will have a greater impact on house
prices than expansionary shocks.
To investigate the empirical relevance of these conjectures, we consider a reduced form
version of the supply-demand model. In the reduced form, supply elasticity is interacted
with all the variables appearing in the supply-demand model.
Our modus operandi is the local projection framework of Jordà (2005). We use this
framework to estimate the cumulative percentage response to house prices h quarters
after a monetary policy shock, for h = 0, 4, 8 and 12. The advantage of using the local
projection approach is that it allows us to study non-linear effects of monetary policy,
which would be vastly complicated – and maybe even infeasible – in a standard VAR
framework. In addition, our parameters of interest – the impulse-response functions of
house prices following a monetary policy shock – are confined to one equation in the
underlying VAR system, i.e., the house price equation.
4.1 Baseline specification
Our baseline empirical specification takes the following form:














′Wi,t + εi,t (3)
where phi,t+h−phi,t−1 is the cumulative change in log house prices after h quarters, RRt
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is the Romer and Romer (2004) shock, Elasticityi is the time-invariant supply elasticities
calculated by Saiz (2010), with a higher value indicating a more elastic housing supply.
We let RRExp.t denote a variable measuring expansionary shocks, and it is calculated
as RRExp.t = RRt × I(RRt ≥ 0), where I(RRt ≥ 0) is an indicator variable taking
the value one for expansionary monetary policy shocks and a value of zero otherwise.
Contractionary shocks are measured by RRContr.t = RRt × (1− I(RRt ≥ 0)).
With this notation, −βExp.h is the cumulative effect on house prices after h quarters
following an expansionary monetary policy shock, whereas βCont.h measures the effect of
a contractionary monetary policy shock after h quarters.
The vector Wi,t contains a set of control variables, including lagged changes in log
house prices, lagged values of the log change in disposable income per capita, lagged
changes in net migration rates and the branching deregulation index used in Favara and
Imbs (2015). For the lagged variables, we include four lags.
Regression results are displayed in Table 3. Consistent with Conjecture I, we find
that expansionary monetary policy shocks lead to higher house prices, but that the effect
is lower for areas with high housing supply elasticity. Supporting Conjecture II, we find
that the effect of contractionary shocks have a negative impact on house prices, and that
this effect is independent of housing supply elasticity.
Regarding Conjecture III, it is clear that the answer depends on housing supply elas-
ticity. Figure 3 shows the responses in house prices to an expansionary monetary policy
shock (upper panel) and to a contractionary monetary policy shock (lower panel) of one
percentage point for the MSAs covered by our sample after two years (h = 8).10 The
maps are constructed so that the color spectrum in the two panels have the same range
in absolute value, with a darker color indicating a greater response in house prices.
We see that expansionary shocks have a greater effect than contractionary shocks in
most areas. In particular, for very congested areas, such as San Francisco (CA) and Miami
10For the contractionary shocks, the response in house prices for area i is calculated as βContr.h +
βContr.,El.h Elasticityi, whereas the response to house prices in area i following an expansionary shock is




(FL), expansionary shocks have more than twice the impact on house prices relative to
contractionary shocks, which is at odds with the simple demand-supply story. That said,
it is also evident that there are several areas in which the effect of a contractionary shock
exceeds that of an expansionary shock. Considering construction elastic areas, such as
Dayton (OH) and Kansas City (MO), the effect of expansionary shocks is smaller than
contractionary shocks. Table B.1 in Appendix B shows the effect of both contractionary
and expansionary shocks after two years for MSAs with a population above one million.
The areas are ranked according to their supply elasticity. The results in that table reveal
that the effect of expansionary shocks is greater than the effect of contractionary shocks
for most of the large MSAs included in our sample.
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Table 3: Asymmetric and heterogeneous effects of monetary policy shocks on house
prices.
Dependent variable is phi,t+h − phi,t−1
Indep. Var. h=0 h=4 h=8 h=12
Contr. MP shock -0.08 -0.80 -3.53∗∗∗ -6.29∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.67) (1.16) (1.77)
Contr. MP shock 0.12 -0.06 0.20 0.42
× Elasticity (0.13) (0.23) (0.38) (0.54)
Exp. MP shock -0.18 2.85∗∗∗ 7.81∗∗∗ 8.13∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.67) (1.01) (1.33)
Exp. MP shock 0.11 -0.59∗∗∗ -1.59∗∗∗ -2.07∗∗∗
× Elasticity (0.08) (0.23) (0.33) (0.46)
Observations 23,212 22,160 21,108 20,056
MSAs 263 263 263 263
R2 0.214 0.341 0.334 0.319
MSA FE YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES
Note: The table shows the effect on house prices of contractionary and expansionary monetary policy
shocks when accounting for different supply elasticities. The dependent variable is the cumulative log
changes in the FHFA house price index at horizon h = 0, 4, 8 and 12. Results are based on estimating
equation (3) using a fixed effect estimator, and the data set covers a panel of 263 US MSAs countries
over the period 1983q1–2007q4. The specification allows the response in house prices to differ depending
on the elasticity of supply, as calculated in Saiz (2010), and whether the monetary policy shock is
expansionary or contractionary. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are
reported in absolute value in parenthesis below the point estimates. The asterisks denote significance
levels: * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1%.
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Note: The effect of an expansionary and a contractionary monetary policy shock for MSAs with
different housing supply elasticity after eight quarters.
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4.2 Controlling for Census Division-by-quarter fixed effects
In our baseline specification, we control for state-specific changes in branching deregu-
lation using the time-varying index of branching deregulation constructed by Rice and
Strahan (2010). To control for other common regional shocks affecting geographically
close MSAs, we add Census Division-by-quarter fixed effects to our baseline specification.
These are dummies for all nine Census Divisions for all quarters spanned by our sample,
and the modified specification takes the following form:







+ ΓWt + εi,t (4)
where ηk,t is the Census Division-by-quarter fixed effects. Note that we cannot include the
non-interacted variables for expansionary and contractionary monetary policy shocks in
this case. This is because a linear combination of these two variables would be perfectly
collinear with the linear combination of the Census Division-by-quarter fixed effects. This
specification therefore does not allow us to draw any conclusion regarding the absolute
response to expansionary and contractionary shocks. That said, we can still test the two
conjectures that expansionary shocks have a more muted response in supply elastic areas
and that the effect of contractionary shocks is independent of supply elasticity.
Results are reported in Table 4. Our results are robust to controlling for Census
Division-by-quarter fixed effects. In particular, the interaction term between expansion-
ary shocks and elasticity is highly significant at all horizons, except contemporaneously.
This suggests that expansionary shocks have a greater impact on house prices the lower is
the elasticity of supply. On the contrary, the interaction between contractionary shocks
and elasticity is insignificant at all horizons. This adds support to our finding that the
effect of contractionary shocks is independent of housing supply elasticity.
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Table 4: Asymmetric and heterogeneous effects of monetary policy shocks on house
prices when controlling for Census Division-by-quarter fixed effects.
Horizon Expansionary shock Contractionary shock No. Obs.
0 0.06 -0.04 23,212
(0.1) (0.12)
4 -0.55∗∗∗ -0.39 22,160
(0.21) (0.25)
8 -0.97∗∗∗ -0.24 21,108
(0.34) (0.36)
12 -1.12∗∗ 0.23 20,056
(0.48) (0.45)
Note: The table shows the effect on house prices of contractionary and expansionary monetary policy
shocks when accounting for different supply elasticities and controlling for Census Division-by-quarter
fixed effects. The dependent variable is the cumulative log changes in the FHFA house price index at
horizon h = 0, 4, 8 and 12. Results are based on estimating equation (3) using a fixed effect estimator,
and the data set covers a panel of 263 US MSAs over the period 1983Q1–2007Q4. The specification allows
the response in house prices to differ depending on the elasticity of supply, as calculated in Saiz (2010),
and whether the monetary policy shock is expansionary or contractionary. We also control for Census
Division-by-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are
reported in absolute value in parenthesis below the point estimates. The asterisks denote significance
levels: * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1%.
5 Momentum effects and asymmetric effects of mone-
tary policy
Following the seminal article by Case and Shiller (1989), numerous studies have doc-
umented that aggregate house price changes are autocorrelated (see e.g., Cutler et al.
(1991), Røed Larsen and Weum (2008), Head et al. (2014)). The momentum in house
prices has been accepted as a key feature of the housing market, and Glaeser et al. (2014)
listed predictability of house price changes by past house price changes as one of three
stylized facts about the housing market.
Several reasons have been put forward to explain why this momentum effect occurs in
the housing market, including variations in time-on-market due to search frictions (Head
et al. (2014)), information frictions (Anenberg (2016)), extrapolative expectation forma-
tion (Case and Shiller (1987); Glaeser et al. (2008); Gelain and Lansing (2014); Glaeser
and Nathanson (2017),Armona et al. (2016)), heterogeneous beliefs and the existence of
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momentum traders (Piazzesi and Schneider (2009); Burnside et al. (2016)), as well as
strategic complementarities (Guren (2017)).
We are agnostic about the exact source of the momentum effect, but the presence
of momentum effects may be important to understand why expansionary monetary pol-
icy shocks can lead to a larger response in house prices than contractionary monetary
policy shocks. A momentum effect that is symmetric over the housing cycle would con-
tribute to further strengthening the conjecture that contractionary shocks hit harder
than expansionary shocks. Any asymmetry in the momentum effect could, however, lead
to different conclusions. In particular, a momentum effect that is more dominant in a
booming market than in a falling market could lead to the opposite conjecture, namely
that expansionary shocks have a greater impact on house prices than the contractionary
shocks – which is consistent with the findings in this paper. If the momentum effect is
more pronounced when house prices are increasing, positive demand shocks are amplified
relatively more than negative demand shocks. Thus, even though the initial response to
a negative demand shock is greater, the total effect of a positive demand shock may be
greater.
To investigate whether there is evidence that the momentum effect is asymmetric, we
estimate an AR(4)-model for house price growth, allowing the coefficients on lagged house
price appreciation to have additional effect whenever house prices are increasing. Table
5 reports the sum of the AR-coefficients both for the case where we do not distinguish
between periods of increasing and decreasing house prices, and for the case where we allow
the momentum to differ depending on whether house prices are increasing or decreasing.
These results support the notion of a momentum effect that is far more pronounced when
house prices are increasing.
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when ∆phi,t > 0 (0.05)
MSAs 263 263
Observations 23,212 23,212
Adj. R2 0.18 0.20
Note: The table reports the sum of coefficients on lagged house price appreciation based on estimating
an AR(4)-model for house price growth. The first column shows the case of symmetric coefficients,
whereas the second column shows coefficients when we allow for an additional momentum effect when
house prices are increasing.
5.1 Monetary policy shocks in a model with durable housing and
asymmetry in the extrapolative expectation formation
While we are agnostic about the exact mechanism leading to a momentum effect, we shall
concentrate on the case of extrapolative expectation formation. In particular, we shall
investigate how an expectation rule that differs depending on whether house prices are
increasing or falling affects the conjectures of the simple supply-demand model.
Assume that expectations affect demand, so that a modified version of the original
demand curve takes the following form:
Di,t = v0rt + v1Yi,t + v2PHi,t + ηEt (PHi,t+1) (5)
Assume also that expectations about future house prices are determined in the fol-
lowing way:
Et (PHi,t+1) ≤
 κ1PHi,t ,when PHi,t > PHi,t−1, κ1 > 1κ2PHi,t ,when PHi,t ≤ PHi,t−1, κ2 < κ1 (6)
Without loss of generality, we shall assume that κ2 = 0, which can be interpreted as
expectations playing no role when house prices are falling. However, in a booming market,
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people expect house prices to continue to increase in the future, which is captured by
κ1 > 1.
By inserting the expectation process in equation (6) into equation (5), we obtain a
modified demand curve:
Di,t =
 v0rt + v1Yi,t + (v2 + ηκ1)PHi,t ,when PHi,t > PHi,t−1v0rt + v1Yi,t + v2PHi,t ,when PHi,t ≤ PHi,t−1 (7)
Extending the supply-demand model to allow for asymmetric extrapolative expecta-
tions formation leads to some interesting mechanisms that are displayed in Figure 4 and
Figure 5. We assume that we start out at point A, which also means that the demand
curve will have a kink at this point.
In Figure 4, we illustrate the case of an expansionary monetary policy shock, shifting
the demand curve out. The interest rate reduction leads to higher house prices and the
new equilibrium is at point C. In the model without asymmetric extrapolative expectation
formation, the new equilibrium would be at point B. In both models an expansionary
monetary policy shock will have a greater impact in supply inelastic markets. However,
in the model with asymmetric and extrapolative execrations formation, there will be an
amplifying effect of the shock due to the price-to-price feedback loop (the movement from
B to C). This effect is greater the lower is the elasticity of supply. Turning to Figure 5,
we illustrate the effect of a contractionary monetary policy shock, leading to a downward
shift in the housing demand curve. The effect of the interest rate increase is the same,
irrespective of whether we allow for extrapolative expectation formation or not. Thus,
the conjecture is still that the price drop is independent of supply elasticity.
Furthermore, for the elastic market, the effect of the contractionary shock is still
greater than the effect of the expansionary shock. However, for the inelastic market,
the interest rate reduction has a greater impact on house prices than the interest rate
increase. Thus, this simple model extension suggests that depending on supply elasticity,
an expansionary monetary policy shock may have a larger or smaller impact on house
24
prices than a contractionary monetary policy shock. We summarize the main conjectures
from this model below.11
Conjecture # 1: Expansionary shocks have a larger impact on house prices in markets
with an inelastic housing supply. The higher the parameter of extrapolation (ηκ1), the
greater is the response to an expansionary shock. The additional acceleration due to
extrapolation is greater the lower is the elasticity of supply.
Conjecture # 2: The effect of contractionary monetary policy shocks is independent
of supply elasticity.
Conjecture # 3: An expansionary shock will have a greater effect than the contrac-
tionary shock if and only if ϕi < ηκ1. Thus, there are positive elasticities for which
expansionary shocks have a greater impact on house prices than contractionary shocks.
Furthermore, the range of elasticities for which this holds increases in ηκ1.
11In Appendix A, we derive the analytical expressions giving rise to these conjectures.
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Market 1: High supply elasticity Market 2: Low supply elasticity
Note: D0 is the original demand curve, while D1 is the demand curve after the interest rate reduction.
The supply curve is given by S. The initial equilibrium is given by point A. The new equilibrium after
the interest rate reduction is given at point C. The dotted part of the housing supply curve illustrates
that housing supply is rigid downwards. The dotted part of the demand curves illustrates how the
demand curve would look in the case where there is no momentum effect. Point B shows the
equilibrium that would prevail in the absence of a price-to-price feedback loop.

























Market 1: High supply elasticity Market 2: Low supply elasticity
Note: D0 is the original demand curve, while D1 is the demand curve after the interest rate increase.
The supply curve is given by S. The initial equilibrium is given by point A. The new equilibrium after
the interest rate increase is given at point B. The dotted part of the demand curves illustrates how the
demand curve would look in the case where there is no momentum effect.
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5.2 Empirical evidence of asymmetry in extrapolative expecta-
tion formation
We use data from Case et al. (2012), which measures house price expectations based on
a series of surveys of homebuyers in four metropolitan areas over the period 2003–2012.
Consistent with their finding, we see that the data provide strong evidence that house
price expectations for the coming year are explained by current house price appreciation.
In fact, a regression of house price expectations on current house prices yields an R2 close
to 0.8.
Figure 6 shows a scatter plot of the Case et al. (2012) data, where we distinguish
between periods of increasing (Panel 1) and falling (Panel 2) house prices. The figure
shows a remarkable asymmetry in expectation formation. In periods of positive house
price appreciation, there is strong evidence that homebuyers expect prices to continue to
increase in the future. However, when house prices are falling, the effect of an expectation
that house prices will continue to fall is far less pronounced. The survey data therefore
suggest that current house prices are much better at predicting house price expectations
in periods of increasing house prices than in periods of falling house prices, with a R2
that is almost twice as large.
To formally address the asymmetries in expectation formation, we estimate the fol-
lowing model by OLS:
Ei,t (∆phi,t+1) = αi + β
+I(∆phi,t ≥ 0)∆phi,t + β−I(∆phi,t < 0)∆phi,t + ui,t (8)
with Ei,t (∆phi,t) denoting the expected increase in house prices at time t over the next
12 months and ∆phi,t measuring the annual price increase at time t.
The results reported in Table 6 provide strong evidence of asymmetry in expectation
formation, which is consistent with our finding of a momentum effect that is more impor-
tant when house prices are increasing. In particular, the extrapolation of current house
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Note: The two figures show scatter plots of house price expectations and positive and negative house
price growth, respectively. Data are taken from Case et al. (2012) and measure house price expectations
based on a series of surveys of homebuyers in four metropolitan areas over the period 2003–2012
Table 6: Asymmetric expectation formation.
Indep. Var. Dep. Var.: Ei,t(∆phi,t+1)
(I) (II)
Current house price growth 0.27∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04)
Current house price growth 0.16∗∗
when ∆phi,t > 0 (0.07)
Observations 40 40
R2 0.84 0.86
Note: The table shows results from estimating equation (8). That is, regressing expected house prices
on current house prices and allowing for an additional effect when house prices increase. We report the








j , respectively. Standard errors are clustered by MSA and
reported in absolute value in parenthesis below the point estimates. The asterisks denote significance
levels: * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1%.
price growth is more pronounced in periods of increasing house prices. The presence
of such asymmetries can explain why expansionary shocks are found to have a greater
impact on house prices than contractionary shocks in most MSAs.
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6 Robustness and sensitivity checks
6.1 MSA-by-MSA analysis
In our baseline model, we account for heterogeneity through the intercept term (MSA-
specific fixed effects). While the panel approach has some advantages, a drawback is that
only the intercept is allowed to vary along the cross-sectional dimension. As has been
highlighted by e.g., Pesaran and Smith (1995); Im et al. (2003); Pesaran et al. (1999);
Phillips and Moon (2000), the pooling assumption of equal slope coefficients may often
be disputed as well. To investigate whether our results are sensitive to this assumption,
we have estimated separate models for each MSA. For MSA i, we estimate the following
specification:






t + ΓiWi,t + εi,t (9)
With N MSAs and H horizons, this gives us two N ×H matrices of the response to
contractionary and expansionary shocks. We then group the MSAs into five equally sized
groups, depending on their supply elasticity. For each group, we calculate the mean group
estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995). Thus, the mean group estimators for quintile q













None of our conclusions is materially affected by this alternative econometric ap-
proach, and results are summarized in Table B.2 in Appendix B.
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6.2 Balanced panel
In our baseline results, reported in 4, we use an unbalanced panel. For 147 of the areas,
we have data for the full period, whereas the starting point for the rest of the MSAs
varies. To explore sensitivity to this, we repeated our analysis on a balanced panel for
the full data sample (1983Q1-2007Q4), covering 147 MSAs. Our results are not affected
by this, see Table B.3 in Appendix B.
6.3 Asymmetric momentum and supply elasticities
We have also explored whether the momentum effect depends on supply elasticity. To
this end, we estimate MSA-specific models allowing for a different effect of lagged house
prices in a booming market. We then collected the sum of coefficients for the common
momentum term and the sum of coefficients for the additional momentum term in a
booming market for each MSA. We then regressed these variables on supply elasticity.
Results from this exercise are summarized in Table B.4 in Appendix B.
The intercepts are highly significant in both specifications, suggesting that the result
of an additional momentum effect in a booming market is maintained in the cross section.
Second, the additional momentum effect is, if anything, somewhat stronger in markets
with low supply elasticity. Thus, allowing for MSA-specific momentum effect would
further strengthen our argument that asymmetries in the momentum effect could cause
expansionary shocks to have a greater impact on house prices than contractionary shocks.
7 Conclusion
We have analyzed the effects of contractionary and expansionary monetary policy shocks
in regional housing markets. Consistent with theory, we find that expansionary shocks
have a substantially greater impact on house prices in markets with an inelastic housing
supply. We also find that, due to the durability of housing, the effect of a contractionary
shock is independent of the elasticity of housing supply. Finally, our results indicate that
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for most elasticities, the effect of an expansionary shock is greater (in absolute value)
than the effect of a contractionary shock. Our results suggest that this is related to a
momentum effect that is more important when house prices are increasing than when
they are falling, and that this may be attributed to an asymmetric and extrapolative
expectation formation.
These results have direct bearing on the discussion on the trade-offs faced by mon-
etary policymakers when it comes to real economic stability and financial stability. As
documented in Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016), Barnichon and Matthes (2017) and An-
grist et al. (2017), a reduction in the interest rate is less effective in stimulating the real
economy than an interest rate increase is in dampening economic activity. In contrast,
our results suggest that an interest rate reduction contribute to amplifying the volatility
of house prices – particularly so in supply inelastic areas. At the same time, an increase
in the interest rate does not affect house prices to the same extent as an expansionary
monetary policy shock.
Finally, as pointed out by Nakamura and Steinsson (2018), estimates based on cross-
sectional identification are powerful in order to discriminate between alternative theo-
retical views. Our findings call for theoretical models that incorporate an asymmetric
transmission of housing demand shocks and that account for state-dependent momentum
effects in the housing market.
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A Analytical expressions for conjectures from baseline
and extended supply-demand models
Baseline model
Boom
In a booming market, the equilibrium house price and housing quantity are given by
equating supply and demand in the regime where investments respond to the deviation












It follows from this that the response in house prices and quantity to an interest rate











Thus, a lower interest rate contributes to higher house prices and a larger supply.
Furthermore, the higher is elasticity of supply, the larger is the quantity reaction and the
lower is the house price reaction.
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Bust
In a falling market, the equilibrium house price and housing quantity are given by equating




(v0rt + v1Yi,t − ψHi,t−1)
S = ψHi,t−1










Thus, a higher interest rate leads to lower house prices, but no change in quantity.
Furthermore, the price response in the bust is independent of supply elasticity, since
supply is perfectly downwardly rigid in all markets during a bust.
Finally, the boom response in house prices (in absolute value) is greater than the bust









−v2 > ϕi − v2
ϕi < 0
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which is logically impossible for any positive supply elasticity. Thus, a simple demand-
supply framework suggests that the price response following a contractionary monetary
policy shock will be greater than the price response to an expansionary monetary policy
shock for any positive supply elasticity.
Model with asymmetry in expectation formation
Boom
In a booming market, the reduced form house price and housing quantity equations in
the period of a shock is given by:
PHi,t =
1
ϕi − v2 − ηκ1
(v0rt + v1Yi,t − ψHi,t−1 + ϕiPi,t)
S =
ϕi
ϕi − v2 − ηκ1




It follows from this that the response in house prices and quantity following an interest









ϕi − v2 − ηκ1
> 0
These are similar to the results in the model without extrapolative house price expecta-
tions when κ1 = 0, but the higher κ1 is, the greater is the price response – and more so
the lower the elasticity of supply is.
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Bust




(v0rt + v1Yi,t − ψHi,t−1)
S = ψHi,t−1
It follows from this that the response in house prices and quantity following an interest









Thus, the price response in the bust is independent of supply elasticity, since supply
is perfectly downwardly rigid in all markets during a bust.
From this, it follows that the boom response in house prices (in absolute value) is
greater than the bust response if and only if :
v0




ϕi − v2 − ηκ1
> − 1
v2
−v2 > ϕi − v2 − ηκ1
ϕi < ηκ1
Thus, there are positive supply elasticities for which the response to an expansionary
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shock is greater than the response to a contractionary shock. Furthermore, the greater
the price-to-price feedback loop, as measured by ηκ1, the greater is the range of elasticities
for which this is true.
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B Tables and figures
Effect of expansionary and contractionary monetary policy shocks
in the largest MSAs
Table B.1: Effect of contractionary and expansionary monetary policy shocks
after two years, MSAs with population > 1 million
Rank MSA name and state Elasticity Exp. Contr.
1 Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall FL 0.6 6.87 -3.41
2 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale CA 0.63 6.82 -3.4
3 Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerfield Beach FL 0.65 6.78 -3.4
4 San Francisco-Redwood City-South San Francisco CA 0.66 6.76 -3.39
5 San Diego-Carlsbad CA 0.67 6.75 -3.39
6 Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley CA 0.7 6.7 -3.39
7 Salt Lake City UT 0.75 6.63 -3.38
8 New York-Jersey City-White Plains NY-NJ 0.76 6.61 -3.37
9 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara CA 0.76 6.61 -3.37
10 New Orleans-Metairie LA 0.81 6.53 -3.36
11 Chicago-Naperville-Arlington Heights IL 0.81 6.53 -3.36
12 Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News VA-NC 0.82 6.52 -3.36
13 West Palm Beach-Boca Raton-Delray Beach FL 0.83 6.5 -3.36
14 Boston MA 0.86 6.45 -3.35
15 Seattle-Bellevue-Everett WA 0.88 6.41 -3.35
16 Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario CA 0.94 6.32 -3.34
17 New Haven-Milford CT 0.98 6.27 -3.33
18 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater FL 1 6.23 -3.33
19 Cleveland-Elyria OH 1.02 6.19 -3.32
20 Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis WI 1.03 6.18 -3.32
21 Jacksonville FL 1.06 6.13 -3.31
22 Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro OR-WA 1.07 6.12 -3.31
23 Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford FL 1.12 6.04 -3.3
24 Newark NJ-PA 1.16 5.98 -3.29
25 Pittsburgh PA 1.2 5.9 -3.28
26 Baltimore-Columbia-Towson MD 1.23 5.85 -3.28
27 Detroit-Dearborn-Livonia MI 1.24 5.84 -3.28
28 Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise NV 1.39 5.61 -3.25
29 Rochester NY 1.4 5.59 -3.24
30 Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington MN-WI 1.45 5.52 -3.24
31 Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford CT 1.5 5.44 -3.23
32 Denver-Aurora-Lakewood CO 1.53 5.39 -3.22
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 Effect of contractionary and expansionary monetary policy shocks
after two years, MSAs with population > 1 million
(Continued from previous page)
Rank MSA name and state Elasticity Exp. Contr
33 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria DC-VA-MD-WV 1.61 5.26 -3.2
34 Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale AZ 1.61 5.25 -3.2
35 Philadelphia PA 1.65 5.2 -3.19
36 Memphis TN-MS-AR 1.76 5.01 -3.17
37 Buffalo-Cheektowaga-Niagara Falls NY 1.83 4.91 -3.16
38 Raleigh NC 2.11 4.47 -3.1
39 Dallas-Plano-Irving TX 2.18 4.36 -3.09
40 Nashville-Davidson–Murfreesboro–Franklin TN 2.24 4.26 -3.07
41 Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land TX 2.3 4.16 -3.06
42 Louisville/Jefferson County KY-IN 2.34 4.1 -3.05
43 St. Louis MO-IL 2.36 4.07 -3.05
44 Grand Rapids-Wyoming MI 2.39 4.02 -3.04
45 Cincinnati OH-KY-IN 2.46 3.91 -3.03
46 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell GA 2.55 3.76 -3.01
47 Columbus OH 2.71 3.51 -2.98
48 Fort Worth-Arlington TX 2.8 3.37 -2.96
49 San Antonio-New Braunfels TX 2.98 3.08 -2.92
50 Austin-Round Rock TX 3 3.05 -2.92
51 Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia NC-SC 3.09 2.91 -2.9
52 Greensboro-High Point NC 3.1 2.9 -2.9
53 Kansas City MO-KS 3.19 2.75 -2.88
54 Oklahoma City OK 3.29 2.59 -2.86
55 Indianapolis-Carmel-Anderson IN 4 1.46 -2.72
Note: This table reports estimated effects of a contractionary monetary policy shock for all MSAs in
our sample with a population above one million. The calculations are based on results reported in
Table 3.
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Results from MSA-by-MSA analysis
Table B.2: Asymmetric effects of monetary policy, grouping by quartiles.
Expansionary shock :
Horizon Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
0 0.148 0.085 0.489 0.602 0.22
(0.196) (0.18) (0.296) (0.235) (0.234)
4 4.019 2.12 1.594 0.806 1.582
(0.587) (0.581) (0.669) (0.609) (0.492)
8 8.801 5.656 3.732 2.652 2.255
(0.914) (0.897) (0.915) (0.898) (0.661)
12 9.392 6.565 3.12 2.398 0.656
(1.269) (1.244) (1.205) (1.344) (0.93)
Contractionary shock :
Horizon Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
0 -0.057 0.337 0.196 0.691 0.668
(0.195) (0.278) (0.335) (0.356) (0.418)
4 -0.578 0.292 -0.269 -1.165 0.146
(0.711) (0.763) (0.703) (0.721) (0.617)
8 -2.855 -2.247 -1.842 -2.773 -0.719
(1.03) (1.068) (1.098) (1.017) (0.937)
12 -3.561 -4.635 -4.002 -3.762 -2.614
(1.478) (1.396) (1.251) (1.261) (1.109)
Note: The table shows mean estimates of the effect of contractionary and expansionary shocks at
different horizons when we group the areas into quartiles depending on their housing supply elasticity.
The underlying model for each MSA allows for full heterogeneity in all coefficients and is estimated using
the mean group estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995).
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Results from balanced panel
Table B.3: Asymmetric and heterogeneous effects of monetary policy shocks on house
prices using a balanced panel.
Dependent variable is phi,t+h − phi,t−1
Indep. Var. h=0 h=4 h=8 h=12
Contr. MP shock 0.22 -0.08 -2.92∗ -6.08∗∗
(0.44) (1.02) (1.72) (2.63)
Contr. MP shock -0.11 -0.81∗ -0.69 -0.21
× Elasticity (0.24) (0.44) (0.70) (0.99)
Exp. MP shock -0.17 4.00∗∗∗ 9.68∗∗∗ 11.08∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.95) (1.45) (1.94)
Exp. MP shock 0.09 -1.32∗∗∗ -2.65∗∗∗ -3.81∗∗∗
× Elasticity (0.16) (0.40) (0.60) (0.84)
Observations 13,961 13,373 12,785 12,197
MSAs 147 147 147 147
R2 0.303 0.403 0.369 0.344
MSA FE YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES
Note: The table shows the effect on house prices of contractionary and expansionary monetary policy
shocks when accounting for different supply elasticities. The dependent variable is the cumulative log
changes in the FHFA house price index at horizon h = 0, 4, 8 and 12. Results are based on estimating
equation 3 using a fixed effect estimator and the data set covers a balanced panel of the 147 MSAs
for which we have data over the full period 1983q1–2007q4. The specification allows the response in
house prices to differ depending on the elasticity of supply, as calculated in Saiz (2010), and whether the
monetary policy shock is expansionary or contractionary. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation are reported in absolute value in parenthesis below the point estimates. The asterisks
denote significance levels: * = 10%, ** = 5% and *** = 1%.
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Allowing for heterogeneity in momentum effects
Table B.4: Asymmetric momentum, MSA-by-MSA.
Momentum Additional momentum






Adj. R2 0.09 0.02
Note: The table shows how the momentum effect and the additional momentum effect in a booming
market are related to housing supply elasticity. The results are based on a two-stage analysis, where we
first estimate an AR(4)-model for house price appreciation, allowing the AR-parameters to be different
when house prices are increasing, for each MSA in the data set. We then calculate the sum of coefficients
on the two momentum terms and regress them on housing supply elasticity. The first column displays
results for the common momentum effect, whereas the second column shows results for the additional
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